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ABSTRACT 
The paper introduces a new way of linking microsimulation models with dynamic general 
equilibrium frameworks to obtain an evaluation of the impact of detailed tax and benefit 
measures on the aggregate economy. In the approach presented in this paper, income 
heterogeneity interacts with the macro-economy via aggregated individual labour supply 
decisions which influence, and are influenced by, the dynamic evolution of the real wage rate. 
The method involves a reduced-form representation of the information flow between the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic blocks. The practical usefulness of the approach is 
demonstrated by evaluating actual and hypothetical tax reforms that involve abandoning the 
flat tax system in Slovakia. A hypothetical move to a highly progressive tax structure is shown to 
generate some employment gains but is associated with a drop in aggregate income and tax 
revenue. 
Keywords: microsimulation, dynamic general equilibrium, unemployment, labour supply 
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1. Introduction 
We introduce a new way of linking microsimulation analysis with a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework. The method we propose makes it easier to evaluate quantitatively the aggregate 
effects of reform measures over time. The aim is to facilitate important policy evaluation work 
as a result of which policy makers will better understand the trade-offs involved in re-designing 
tax and benefit frameworks. The trade-offs can be of the usual equity versus efficiency nature 
but a dynamic framework enables to consider the intertemporal aspects of policy design too. 
The fact that (the expectations of) the dynamic evolution of the economy matter in modern 
macroeconomic models but (behavioural) microsimulation exercises have been typically based 
on static frameworks have presented researchers with a difficult challenge when blending the 
two together. This has been particularly true for the class of models that rely on full integration 
of the micro and macro blocks. Such models require the same level of detail to be coherently 
elaborated in both blocks of the model. 
Much of the existing literature that links microsimulation models with macroeconomic 
frameworks is therefore static in nature. Barrios et al. (2017) is a notable exception. They exploit 
a key insight from the work of Magnani and Mercenier (2009) according to which the problem 
of agents facing a specific choice among a discrete set of alternatives can be expressed and 
aggregated in a consistent manner in both a behavioural microsimulation model and a suitable 
macroeconomic framework. The microsimulation exercise is used to calibrate effective tax rates 
and a set of deep (i.e. policy-invariant) parameters affecting household decision making in a 
large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework augmented to enhance its 
consistency with the behavioural microsimulation tool. The macroeconomic framework is then 
operated independently.        Ǯ-ǯ    
microsimulation and macroeconomic Ǯ
ǯ (see Colombo, 2010, Cockburn et al., 2014, or Peichl, 2016). 
We also build on the earlier literature involving static computable general equilibrium models. 
  ǡ ǡ    Ǯ-down/bottom-ǯ tradition of Savard (2003). 
Models using such an approach would involve an iterative algorithm which feeds information 
about aggregate variables into the macroeconomic framework, and then in turn channels 
information from the macroeconomic model back into the microsimulation block until 
convergence. Benczur et al. (2018), for example, have used such an iterative approach to solve 
for the long-run general equilibrium in their framework. 
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We operationalise the two-way interaction between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic 
block in a dynamic context by estimating a reduced-form relationship between the variables that 
carry the information from one framework to another. The estimation is based on pairwise 
observations for those key variables generated in the microsimulation block. More specifically, 
we discretise an interval of real wage rates, and use the microsimulation model with a given 
policy parameterisation to obtain aggregate outcomes, such as the employment rate, 
corresponding to the various points on the interval. We then estimate the parameters of a 
polynomial to obtain continuous non-linear functions linking the real wage rate to the aggregate 
outcomes which close our macroeconomic model. 
The dynamic general equilibrium framework in this paper is small open economy model with a 
labour market augmented for the presence of matching frictions.2 In this framework, we replace 
the standard equilibrium real wage determination through theoretical bargaining with the 
mapping of wage responses into aggregate labour supply changes obtained from a behavioural 
microsimulation exercise as described above.3 It is at this point that heterogeneity enters the 
picture and matters for aggregate dynamics in the model. Agents at different income (and 
productivity) levels will react to policy changes differently, which affects the aggregate effective 
labour supply that drives, together with physical capital, production in the economy. 
One advantage of our approach is that we can solve the macroeconomic model for the long-run 
equilibrium as well as the transition in one go using standard techniques. We show the 
equivalence of our approach and the iterative approach à la Savard (2003) when it comes to the 
(static) long-run steady state. Understanding the features of the transition to that long-run 
steady state can, however, be important for policy design. Our methodology allows to establish 
whether that is the case. The implication of the results from one of the scenarios we examine is 
that transitional dynamics can have significant welfare and fiscal implications. 
                                                     
2  Our choice of the macroeconomic framework is motivated by analytical tractability that permits 
distilling the key mechanisms at work, as well as internal consistency with the behavioural 
microsimulation part. The approach outlined in the paper would, however, work with a wide range of 
dynamic general equilibrium frameworks featuring various real and nominal rigidities to provide a better 
match with moments in the data. Extensions in that direction are discussed in section 5. 
3 This approach echoes the analysis of Farmer (2013, 2016) with the notable difference that the task of 
equilibrium selection in a model with multiple solutions is assigned to a relationship obtained from 
empirical analysis outside the theoretical model rather than a belief function. 
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Our approach also achieves integration between microsimulation and the macroeconomic 
model without imposing parameter restrictions on the microsimulation through consistency 
conditions as in the top-down approach of Bourguignon et al. (2005). At the same time, 
consistency in preferences that underlie the analysis in both blocks of the model is a strength of 
the approach. The method is also applicable in environments in which data limitations rule out 
assuming the specific type of choice by individual agents that allows obtaining consistent 
aggregation in both the microsimulation and CGE modules in the approach of Magnani and 
Mercenier (2009).  
On the other hand, a drawback of our method is that the estimated reduced-form relationship 
conveying information between the macroeconomic and microsimulation blocks is not policy-
invariant. One can think about its slope in the neighbourhood of the steady state as the 
aggregate-level labour supply elasticity in linear macroeconomic models. This, however, needs 
to be re-estimated for each alternative policy mix under consideration. The purely bottom-up 
approach, instead, aims to capture the micro-level elasticities. 
We demonstrate our method and its usefulness by evaluating the aggregate macroeconomic and 
fiscal effects of actual and hypothetical tax reforms in Slovakia. The late 1990s and early 2000s 
saw a wave of radical tax reforms introducing flat tax regimes in several Central and Eastern 
European countries. The one that took place in 2004 in Slovakia bore close resemblance to the 
simple system proposed in Hall and Rabushka (1983). The personal income tax element of the 
reform involved a simple linear schedule that some consider to be close to optimal following 
Mirrlees (1971).4 Whilst the system stood the test of times in some countries, policy makers in 
Slovakia opted for a gradual repeal of the simple progressive system over time citing the need to 
improve overall budget balance in an equitable way. We show that the enacted departures from 
the flat income tax schedule are associated with neither significant fiscal or employment gains 
or losses. 
                                                     
4 See Mankiw et al. (2009) for more recent considerations along the same lines. There is also a body of 
literature featuring incomplete markets supporting simple linear tax structures, e.g. Ventura (1999), 
Conesa and Krueger (2006), Diaz-Gimenez and Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Conesa et al. (2009). Henceforth, 
ǲǳǤ On the other 
hand, many have questioned the optimality of flat tax regimes. See, for example, Tuomala (1984), Tuomala 
(1990), Diamond and Saez (2011), and Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015). Zelenak and Moreland (1999) also 
provide a good non-technical overview of the arguments for a graduated tax structure. 
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Furthermore, in a hypothetical exercise, we find that a return to an even more redistributive 
system of graduated marginal tax rates would generate only small employment/unemployment 
and aggregate income changes if accompanied by cuts in allowances to ensure short-term 
revenue neutrality. This scenario approximates the opposite of the reform introduced in 2004. 
The impact on tax revenue may well be negative over time due to the job losses. This echoes 
some of the findings in Fuest et al. (2008). We also show that a radical reversal of the flat tax 
reform in which short-run fiscal neutrality is ensured through very high marginal tax rates on 
top earners is associated with significant output and tax revenue losses, although there are small 
associated gains in employment. Similar effects are also generated in the incomplete markets 
setup of Holter et al. (2015).5 
Our work is thus also related to the literature examining the consequences of flat tax reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Our results confirm the importance of considering the tax reform 
in the wider context of tax-benefit changes, as emphasized in Keen et al. (2008). Ivanova et al. 
(2005) do not find strong effects on work incentives of the flat tax reform in Russia, casting doubt 
on the importance of the incentive effect of large cuts in top marginal rates. Whilst reporting 
some intensive margin effects for males in general and females at both ends of the work hour 
distribution, Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2010) do not attribute significant aggregate 
employment and tax revenue gains to the introduction of the flat tax reform in Russia. Finally, 
we do not consider the endogenous growth implications of tax reforms, although this may be a 
potentially important channel in the long run as shown in Azacis and Gillman (2010), albeit one 
that needs to be subjected to a proper empirical test.6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the details of the different 
elements of the model, specifies the calibration of the key parameters of the macroeconomic 
                                                     
5 The approach taken in this paper as well as the solution algorithm we employ also bears resemblance to 
the methods used to solve such incomplete market models going back to Marcet et al. (2007). There are 
two differences. First, the individual-level decision function is an empirically estimated labour supply 
relationship. Second, the underlying heterogeneity is fed into the model directly from an empirical sample 
used in the microsimulation part rather than simulations of interaction of individual decision functions 
and idiosyncratic uncertainty. As in the case of incomplete market models, the solution algorithm then 
searches for equilibrium prices that equate aggregate factor supply and demand. A clear practical 
advantage of combining theoretical and empirical blocks is that the framework can readily evaluate the 
consequences of a wide range of tax and benefit reforms at a fine level of detail. 
6 Cassou and Lansing (2004) have also found such growth enhancing effects of the Hall-Rabushka proposal 
in a theoretical framework. Holter et al. (2015) point out that the consequences of tax reforms for human 
capital accumulation also depend on how it is modelled. 
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framework, and explains the solution algorithm. Section 3 describes the tax reform scenarios 
examined in the paper. Section 4 presents the key results from the baseline model while section 
5 discusses the sensitivity of the results to parametric changes as well as possible extensions of 
the model. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
The model used in our study is a representative-agent dynamic general equilibrium framework 
linked with a behavioural microsimulation part (ǯǡ2014). 
The framework is a standard open economy model of the labour market with a matching friction 
with one notable modification. Instead of explicitly modelling a bargaining process over the 
surplus generated by matches, equilibrium wage determination is captured by an approximated 
relationship between the wage rate and employment coming from a behavioural 
microsimulation exercise. For a given tax reform, potential financial gains and losses for every 
individual in the sample are calculated, and individual labour supply reactions are assessed. 
Individual labour supply responses are then aggregated to obtain an aggregate employment 
response, together with effective (productivity-adjusted) labour and total household disutility. 
For a given tax reform scenario, such aggregate responses are calculated assuming simultaneous 
aggregate real wage shocks of different magnitudes. Polynomial approximation is then used to 
obtain a continuous schedule in the (real wage, employment) plane, among others, that is 
embedded into the dynamic macroeconomic framework. Under the assumptions of the model, 
this setup permits the computation of the post-reform long-run steady state as well as the 
sequence of rational expectations equilibria occurring in transition to that steady state in a single 
numerical exercise. 
2.1. The theoretical block 
Households.- Our small open economy is inhabited by an infinite number of identical 
households. The representative household is made up of a continuum of members (indexed i) 
Ǥǯ 
D?଴ ෍ D?௧ ۖەۖ۔
ۓ൤D?௧ െ ׬ D?௧ሺD?ሻଵାI?I? ? ൅ D?௜ D?D?൨ଵିI? ? െ D? െ  ? ? െ D?ۗۖۘۖۙ 
in which D? is household consumption of a homogeneous good, D?ሺD?ሻ stands for the fraction of 
time each household member spends in employment (with D?ሺD?ሻ א ሾ ?ǡ ?ሿሻ, the parameter D?௜ ൐  ? 
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denotes individual-level (inverse) labour-supply elasticity and, finally, D? ൐  ? is a risk aversion 
parameter.7 The parameter D? is the subjective discount factor of the household. One period in 
our model will correspond to one quarter. 
The household budget constraint is given by  ሺ ? ൅ D?௖ሻD?௧ ൅ ௔I?ଵା௥ ൌ D?௧ିଵ ൅ ׬ሾD?௧ሺD?ሻD?௧ሺD?ሻ ൅ D?௧ሺD?ሻ െ D?௧ሺD?ሻሿD?D?     (1) 
where D?stands for assets accumulated by the household, D? is the quarterly world real interest 
rate, D?ሺD?ሻ stands for the real wage rate earned by the member of the household and can be 
thought of as a product of an economy-wide gross real wage rate D? and an idiosyncratic 
productivity component D?ሺD?ሻwith a mean of 1. This idiosyncratic component can be thought of 
as a combination of ex ante observable and unobservable, deterministic and stochastic 
components that affect productivity. Labour is assumed to be perfectly substitutable. Hence, 
only the aggregate quantity of effective labour obtained as a productivity-weighted sum of 
individual labour supplies that enter the production process matter. Wage differentials only 
reflect differences in productivity. 
The variable D?ሺD?ሻ stands for dividend income. The variable D?ሺD?ሻ  represent the net tax and 
transfer payments paid by the members of the household (which includes the income tax paid 
by the household) and D?௖ is the consumption tax rate.  
It is assumed here that income is pooled within the household, and that all households in the 
economy start with identical asset holdings. 
One convenient analytical consequence of the assumption of income pooling at the household 
level and of perfect elasticity of capital supply (the small open economy assumption) is that they 
permit solving the intertemporal consumption choice at the aggregate level independently of 
the production side of the economy. Hence, we only have one Euler equation (9) below rather 
than individual-level intertemporal choice.8 
                                                     
7 Note that D?ሺD?ሻ can also be interpreted as the probability of being employed (which is consistent with 
our output from the microsimulation exercise). As a result, the average D? across household members can 
be interpreted as the aggregate employment rate. 
8 Note that income pooling within household implies permanent lump-sum transfers across household 
members if idiosyncratic productivity differences are permanent. Considering formally the consequences 
of tax and benefit measures for consumption heterogeneity (and consumption tax receipts), and in turn 
of the heterogeneity in wealth effects on labour supply is an import
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Technology.- We assume that production of goods is given by a standard CES production 
function which combines effective aggregate labour and capital:  D?௧ ൌ ሾD?D?௧I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧I?ሿI?഑Ǥ         (2) 
The parameters D?and elasticity of substitution defined as ଵሺଵିI?ሻ  are positive with D? אሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ. 
Effective labour is derived from individual household member labour supply. Total labour 
supply (employment) in the economy is given by D?௧ ൌ ׬ D?௧ሺD?ሻD?D?. Total effective labour in the 
economy is given by D?௧ ൌ ׬ D?௧ሺD?ሻD?௧ሺD?ሻD?D?. And so on aggregate, we have D?௧ ൌ D?௧D?௧.           (3) 
Equation (3) is a key relationship in our framework. It is through this relationship that the 
heterogeneous consequences of tax and benefit reforms enter the macroeconomy. Different tax 
and benefit measures will have a differentiated effect on individual labour supply D?௧ሺD?ሻ, and it is 
crucial for the evolution of the aggregate economy which productivity types are affected and in 
what way, as the individual-level impacts then get weighted by productivity to determine 
effective labour supply in the economy. 
Aggregate employment evolves according to  D?௧ ൌ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧ିଵ ൅ D?௧ ǡ         (4) 
in which D? stands for the exogenous separation rate and D? denotes the number of new matches 
(hires) in each period. Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), we assume that newly hired labour 
becomes productive immediately.  
The model is that of a small open economy and capital is supplied elastically at the world interest 
rate D?.  
Labour market.- The hiring process is governed by the standard Cobb-Douglas matching 
function D?௧ ൌ D?D?௧IRD?௧ଵିIR           (5) 
where  D?௧ ൌ  ? െ D?௧            (6) 
is the unemployment (rate) in our economy. The variable D? denotes vacancies, while parameter D? measures the efficiency of matching process and D? is the match elasticity of the unemployed. 
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The probability of filling a vacancy and the probability of being matched with a job are then 
given by D?௧ ൌ ௠I?௩I?           (7) 
and D?௧ ൌ ௠I?௨I?, respectively.  
Firms.- There is a large number of competitive profit-maximizing firms. They employ capital and 
labour to produce a homogeneous good. The representative firm solves the problem given by ௄I?ǡ௅I?ǡ௩I?D?௧ ෍ D?௧൛ሺ ? െ D?ிሻൣD?௧ െ ൫ ? ൅ D?௪ǡ௧൯D?௧D?௧ െ D?D?௧൧ െ D?D?௧ൟǤ 
This setup assumes firms make their decision after the individual productivity levels have been 
revealed. In this equation, D?௪ denotes the average payroll tax rate paid by employers.  
In addition to these economic profits, we consider the accounting profits of firms which in each 
period are simply given by D?௧ െ ൫ ? ൅ D?௪ǡ௧൯D?௧D?௧ െ D?D?௧.9 These profits are taxed at a rate D?ி. The 
last term in the profit function stands for the hiring costs, assuming there is a constant cost D? 
per vacancy associated with posting vacancies. 
Government.- The government issues one-period debt at the world interest rate to bridge the 
gap between revenue and spending. The government budget constraint is given by ௕I?ଵା௥ ൌ D?௧ିଵ െ ׬ D?௧ሺD?ሻD?D?െ D?௪ǡ௧D?௧D?௧ െ D?௖D?௧ െ D?ிሾD?௧ െ ሺ ? ൅ D?௪ሻD?௧D?௧ െ D?D?௧ሿ ൅ D?௧  (8) 
where D? is general government consumption, assumed to be exogenous and in terms of 
international units of consumption. 
Policy shocks.- The model allows us to investigate a number of various policy experiments. The 
ones we concentrate on in this paper enter the model through the net transfer payments to the 
household D?ሺD?ሻ and indirectly through the effective D?௪ǡ௧. 
Equilibrium in a decentralized economy.- The problem of the household yields the following 
consumption Euler equation 
                                                     
9 See Anagnostopoulos et al. (2014) for a discussion of the difference between economic and accounting 
profits. The consideration of accounting profits allows us to capture the impact of policy changes on the 
reported profitability of the private sector. 
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D?D?௧ ൤஼I?I?I?ି׬I?I?I?I?ሺI?ሻI?I?ചI?I?I?ചI? ௗ௜൨I?ം൤஼I?ି ׬I?I?ሺI?ሻI?I?ചI?I?I?ചI? ௗ௜൨I?ം ൌ ଵଵା௥Ǥ        (9) 
Note that D?ሺ ? ൅ D?ሻ ൌ  ? implies a perfectly smooth profile for household utility in equilibrium. 
Firms maximize profits subject to the equation describing the dynamic of employment with D?௧ ൌ D?ሺD?௧ሻD?௧, taking labour market tightness as given. The optimality conditions are ௖I?I?௤I? ൌ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧I?ିଵሾD?D?௧I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧I?ሿቀI?഑ିଵቁ െ ሺ ? ൅ D?௪ሻD?௧ ൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?D?௧ ௖I?I?௤I?I?I?ǡ  (10) D?D?௧I?ିଵሾD?D?௧I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧I?ሿቀI?഑ିଵቁ ൌ ௥ሺଵିIXI?ሻǤ       (11) 
The aggregate period resource constraint of the economy is given by D?௧ െ D?D?௧ ൌ D?௧ ൅ D? ൅ D?௧ ൅ D?D?௧         (12) 
in which the variable D?D? stands for trade balance. The external asset balance of the economy 
evolves according to D?௧ െ D?௧ ൌ D?D?௧ ൅ ሺ ? ൅ D?ሻሺD?௧ିଵ െ D?௧ିଵሻ.        (13) 
Investments D? evolve following the capital accumulation equation D?௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧ ൅ D?௧         (14) 
where D? is the depreciation rate. 
Equilibrium in our economy is a set of allocations ൛D?௧ǡ D?௧ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ǡ D?௧ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௧ ǡ D?௪ǡ௧ ǡ D?௧ǡ D?D?௧ǡ D?௧ൟ௧ୀ଴ஶ  and the price of labour ሼD?௧ሽ௧ୀ଴ஶ  such 
that satisfy equations (2) Ȃ (14). We have defined aggregate disutility from work D?௧ ൌ׬ ேI?ሺ௜ሻI?I?ചI?ଵାI?I? D?D?. 
There are fewer equations than unknowns at this stage, and hence there are multiple solutions 
to the model. To pin down a unique solution, we use relationships between the wage rate and a 
vector of variables (including employment), conditional on a given policy shock, obtained from 
the behavioural microsimulation exercise. The exact procedure to obtain the wage-employment 
relationship is described in the next subsection.  
The results of the empirical exercise Ȃ for a given tax-benefit reform scenario Ȃ are sets of pairs ሼሺD?ෝǡ D?ሻǡ ሺD?ෝǡ D?ሻǡ ሺD?ෝǡ D?௪ሻǡ ሺD?ෝǡ D?ሻሽ  with D?ෝ ൌ ௪I?௪  where D? is the steady-state wage rate defined 
below. Here, D?ෝ takes on a discrete set of values on an interval covering a reasonable distance 
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from the steady state. The relationship between the respective variables and the real wage can 
be approximated using polynomials D?௧ ൌ  ? D?௫ǡ௜D?ෝ௧௜௡௜ୀ଴  for D? ൌሼD?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ ሽ . 10  These estimated 
polynomials, or reduced-form relationships between the variables, then determine the rational 
expectations equilibrium in our model. 11 
The exogenous shock that sets the economy into motion is an unexpected reform of the tax-
benefit system. Fiscal policy parameters are otherwise held constant. In this sense, our model is 
not closed, as it misses a mechanism Ȃ a fiscal policy response function Ȃ that would guarantee 
a non-explosive trajectory for household and government net assets in the economy. The 
simulations from the model should, therefore, be treated as technical projections only solved 
under the assumption of perfect foresight.12 
The steady state.- The non-stochastic steady state equilibrium is a vector D? ൌሼD?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ ǡ D?ǡ D?ǡ ǡ D?ሽ that solves the equations D? ൌሾD?D?I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?I?ሿଵI? D? ൌD?D? D? ൌD?D? D? ൌ D?D?IRD?ଵିIR D? ൌ  ? െ D? D? ൌD?D? 
                                                     
10 The estimation of parameters D?௫ǡ௜happens independently of the macroeconomic model. They are best 
thought of as aggregate-level elasticities obtained from the microsimulation exercise that are invariant to 
the developments in the macroeconomy. For example, the parameter D?ேǡଵ  could be thought of as the 
analogue of the constant Frisch elasticity of labour supply parameter (with respect to gross wages) 
commonly used in macroeconomic models. One could use other approximation techniques, including 
non-parametric interpolation methods, and possibly achieve a higher degree of accuracy. In incomplete 
market models, such approximations are applied to the individual decision function but that is impractical 
in the present context.  
11 Note that the household budget constraint (1) iǯǤ 
12 It is implicit in the equilibrium conditions that the household and government net assets satisfy the 
transversality condition. In general, in the absence of such a rule, we have to appeal to the possibility of 
the government implementing a suitable lump-sum tax in the future to ensure the asset position remains 
finite. In practice, the asset position remains finite in the projections we consider. 
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D? ? ൅ D?D? ൌ න D?ሺ ሻD?D?൅ D?௪D?D?൅ D?D?൅ D?௖D? ൅ D?ிሾD? െሺ ? ൅ D?௪ሻD?D?െ D㼇?ሿ െ D? D?D?D?ሺD?ሻሾ ? െሺ ? െ D?ሻD?ሿ ൌሺ ? െ D?ሻD?I?ିଵሾD?D?I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?I?ሿቀଵI?ି ଵቁ െ ሺ ? ൅ D?௪ሻD? D?D?I?ିଵሾD?D?I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?I?ሿቀଵI?ି ଵቁ ൌ D?ሺ ? െ D?ிሻ D? െ D㼇?ൌ D? ൅ D? ൅ D? ൅D? D?ሺD? െ D?ሻ ൌ D?D? D?D?ൌ D? D? ൌ D?௫ǡ଴௧  for D? ൌ ሼD?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ሽ. 
In the last equation, the coefficient D?௫ǡ଴௧  is indexed by t to distinguish between (policy in) the 
initial steady state ሺD? ൌ  ?ሻand the final steady state ሺD? ൌ D?ሻ. The value of D? (and D?) in the initial 
steady state is determined by calibrating the different component shares of aggregate income to 
empirical values. 
2.2. The wage-employment schedule 
The microsimulation block of the model underlies the empirical side of the analysis. The aim of 
this part is to simulate the labour supply response of individuals to changes in taxes and transfers 
resulting from actual or hypothetical reforms and simultaneous wage shocks of different 
magnitudes (according to the discretised values, including zero). Labour supply of an individual 
consists of two main components Ȃ the decision at the extensive (whether to supply labour) and 
the intensive margins (hours worked conditional on being employed) that are modelled 
separately.  
When using the categorization of labour supply models within microsimulation framework 
provided by Aaberge and Colombino (2014), the approach taken can be classified as 
ǲǳǤ-definition of the reservation wage (the threshold 
to accept a wage offer) at the cost that the participation decision needs to be constrained to a 
full-time job. However, in the context of Slovakia, we claim that this assumption is not 
significantly restrictive. According to EUROSTAT data, Slovakia is the country with one of the 
lowest rates of part-time employment. The share of part-time workers reached only 3.9 percent 
in 2012 (5.7 in 2017) as opposed to the average 19 percent reported in the EU-28. In addition, in 
the underlying SILC dataset corresponding to income reference period 2012, only 2 percent of 
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employees report their actual economic status as being employed part-time. Moreover, only few 
employees in the sample report hours worked other than corresponding to a full-time 
employment. These facts led us to estimate extensive and intensive margins separately rather 
than employing the discrete choice approach, where a set of options is considered 
simultaneously. 
The behavioural response to an income shock at the extensive margin is evaluated as the 
adjustment of ǯ     , using the econometric 
approach presented in Senaj et al. (2016). The model follows to some extent the approach of 
Benczur et al. (2014). The iǯis based on the rationale 
of utility maximization consistent with the preferences used in the macroeconomic framework. 
Individual participation probabilities are determined by comparing income in two labour 
market states: being economically active (and work full-time) and being inactive (and receiving 
full amount of transfers). In other words, it is necessary to accurately evaluate the disposable 
income of an individual. To do so, the concept of the gains to work (effective net wage) of an 
individual D? is defined as the difference between the net wage (D?௝) and the amount of welfare 
benefits lost when individual is working.13 We need a microsimulation tool to construct the 
vector of gains to work (D?D?D?௝). We use the SIMTASK calculator to compute net wages from 
gross wages and simulate the amount of social benefits an individual is entitled to when working 
and when not working, taking into   ǯ     
characteristics of the corresponding household. 14  The probability of being economically active 
of an individual D? in the sample is estimated by a probit equation: 
 ቀ௝ቁ ൌ Ȱ൫D? D?D?D?௝ ൅ D?௝N?D? ൅ D? D?D?௝൯.  (15) D?D?௝ stands for non-labour income and sums three components, namely the social transfers that 
one receives when not working, the non-labour income of all household members including and 
                                                     
13 Since income from employment is naturally unobservable for those who are unemployed or inactive, we 
use ǯǤ 
14 SIMTASK is described in detail in Siebertova et al. (2016). This tool can be used to simulate direct taxes 
(namely labour and capital income taxes), health, social insurance contributions paid by 
employees/employers and selected transfers (for example child allowances or means tested material need 
benefit). SIMTASK runs on the survey dataset SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) that 
comprises detailed information on individuals and households living in Slovakia. 
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the net labour income of other household members. The construction of this variable also 
involves using our microsimulation tool. Finally, D?௝  denotes a set of observable individual 
characteristics. The computed elasticities are broadly in line with the results usually reported in 
the literature. The results document that participation probabilities in general depend on the 
level of net income and social transfers and that low-skilled and females are the groups that are 
particularly responsive to changes in taxes and transfers (see Senaj et al., 2016). On average, a 
one percent rise in net-wage leads to 0.14 percentage point increase in the participation 
probability for females and 0.1 for males. The effect of non-labour income on participation 
probability is comparable for both genders: a one percent rise yields around 0.04 percentage 
points decrease in supplying labour for both genders.15   
The results from the estimation of the probit model directly feed into the assessment of the 
participation effect of the analysed reforms. Using the microsimulation model SIMTASK of tax 
and transfer system, the gains to work and non-labour income are evaluated for every individual D? both in baseline (pre-reform) and scenario (post-reform). In the next step, using the estimated 
coefficients from the probit model, individual participation probabilities D?I?ෝ ൌ Ȱ൫D?ො D?௝ ൅D?௝N?D?ො ൅ D?෠  D?D?௝൯ are evaluated both in baseline and scenario cases. 
The second decision about supplying labour deals with the number of hours worked, conditional 
on being employed. For this intensive margin response, the pre- and post-reform changes in the 
effective average (D?D?D?D?) and marginal (D?D?D?D?) tax rates need to be calculated. Using a variant 
of Gruber and Saez (2002) approach, Bakos et al. (2008) derived a link between income growth D?ෝ and tax rates::  ?ሺD?ෝሻ ൌ D?௠  ?ሺ ? െ D?D?D?D?ሻ ൅ ௔  ?ሺ ? െ D?D?D?D?ሻ. 
The parameter D?௠ represents the effective marginal net-of-tax rate elasticity (substitution effect) 
and D?௔  represents the effective average net-of-tax rate elasticity (income effect). Intensive 
margin elasticities D?௠  and D?௔ are calibrated since suitable Slovak data are not available. The 
parameter  D?௠ is set to 0.2 for the top 20 percent of the income distribution and D?௔ is set to zero, 
following ǯ(2015) estimation for Hungary. By definition, hours worked in 
baseline are set to 1. After some manipulations, the labour supply response at the intensive 
                                                     
15 The estimated elasticities used in this study are slightly different from those reported in Senaj et al. 
(2016). Here, we are using a pooled sample corresponding to years 2010-13 and an updated version of the 
microsimulation model SIMTASK. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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margin of an individual j, conditional on being employed, is then the relative change in the 
effective hours worked and can be expressed as a function of the marginal and the average 
effective tax rates and income growth: 
ሺÇሻ෢ ൌ ௛ሺ௜ሻI?I?௛ሺ௜ሻI촌?ൌ  ? ൅ Ɍሺǡ ǡ D?ෝሻ. 
In the micro part, employment is modelled so that the labour supply model of individual 
participation decision is combined with a rationing risk model (Bargain et al., 2010). In the 
standard labour supply models, it is assumed that individuals can find an employment with 
certainty. If this assumption is relaxed, there exist individuals who want to work but do not find 
an employment, thus they are involuntary unemployed. The risk of rationing - an individual 
probability of being involuntary unemployed - can be estimated as a probit specification ൫௝ ൌ  ?൯ ൌ Ɍோ൫D?௝N?D?൯. (16) 
IUNEMP is a binary variable that equals one if an individual is involuntary unemployed and zero 
otherwise,   contains individual and local labour market characteristics (demand side variables) 
that influence the probability of rationing.16 If we assume that there exist individuals who are 
involuntarily unemployed, the decision process of an individual can be described as a double-
hurdle. First, decision whether to participate in the labour market or to stay inactive should be 
taken. Second hurdle concerns the probability of being involuntarily unemployed if the person 
is active. Therefore, individual can be found in one of the following 3 states: being inactive, being 
active and involuntarily unemployed and finally, active and working full-time. Under the 
assumption that the two processes are independent, the probit equations can be estimated 
separately. The probability of being employed considered in the second hurdle is estimated such 
that probabilities of the standard model are multiplied by the probabilities implied by the 
rationing risk model:  
D?ሺD?D?D?ሻI?෣ ൌ Ȱ൫D?ො D?D?D?௝ ൅ D?௝N?D?ො െ ɗ෡ D?D?௝൯ ቀ ? െ Ȱோ൫D?௜N?D?መ൯ቁ.  (17) 
                                                     
16 In our representation, individual characteristics include education, age in the quadratic form, labour 
market experience in the quadratic form, dummies for no work history and unfavourable health status. 
Controls for local labour market characteristics include dummy for the density of settlement and regional 
unemployment rate. Detailed specification and estimation results are available upon request. 
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Finally, individual employment probabilities in the sample are summed up to get an estimate of 
the aggregate employment rate. Effective aggregate labour, total disutility from work and the 
 ǯ       by a similar aggregation from the 
microsimulation model. We repeat this for different wage shocks interacted with the policy 
reforms that are examined.   
2.3. Model parameterization and solution 
Parameterization.- The parameters of the macro model are set to match Slovak data wherever 
possible. The production function parameters D? and D? are set at 0.43 and -1.1, respectively, from 
the CES production function estimates presented in Bencik (2008). The job separation rate D? is 
set at 0.004 in line with the figures presented in European Commission (2013). The matching 
elasticity of the unemployed D? is calibrated to 0.8 in line with the search and matching literature 
for Slovakia (see Zeleznik, 2012 or Nemec, 2013), whilst the scaling factor of matching function D? is chosen at 0.05 in order to match Slovak data on vacancies. The cost of posting a vacancy D? 
is normalized to 1. We set the quarterly discount factor D? at a value corresponding to the inverse 
of the gross real interest rate which is set at 4 percent in annual terms. 17  The preference 
parameter D? is set to 1 in the baseline parameterization. 
Computing the final steady state and transitional dynamics.- In order to compute the dynamic 
solution to the model assuming perfect foresight, we proceed as follows.  
First, we solve for the initial steady state, given the calibration above. 
To obtain the final steady state and transition to that steady state, we embed an algorithm that 
solves a system of nonlinear equations (implemented through the fsolve function in Matlab) into 
a Fair and Taylor (1983)-type algorithm.18 The algorithm consists of the following steps: 
1. Guess the length of transition T. 
                                                     
17 The results are quantitatively sensitive to the choice of the world interest rate (see section 5). Arguably, 
4 percent is high for reforms enacted in 2012. The model as presented here is, however, not meant to be a 
real-time forecasting tool in its current form, and it also abstracts from deeper cyclical considerations. 
18 It is possible to use linear approximation to obtain a dynamic solution for the model (see the Appendix). 
But given the scale of the changes in the tax system we examine in one of our scenarios, and the potential 
nonlinearities involved in both the theoretical setup and the microsimulation exercise generally, we 
decided to stick to a nonlinear solution. 
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2. Compute the initial steady state using D? ൌ D?௫ǡ଴଴  for D? ൌ ሼD?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ሽ in the system of steady-
state equilibrium relationships. 
3. Compute the final steady state of the model, given the parameter values, most notably 
the post-reform D?௫ ǯǤ More specifically, use D? ൌ D?௫ǡ଴்  for D? ൌ ሼD?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ሽ in the system of 
steady-state equations.  
4. Guess the path of employment from the initial steady state to the final steady state D?଴ ൌሼD?௧଴ሽ௧ୀ଴்  
5. Given the final steady state obtained in step 3, and the guess for the transition path in 
step 4, solve the equilibrium conditions backwards to period 2. 
6. Solve the model forwards from period 1, given the transition path for D? obtained in step 
5. 
7. Check if the path obtained for D? in step 5, denoted D?ଵ is the same as D?଴. If not, update 
guess in step 4 as follows: D?଴ ൌ D?D?଴ ൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?ଵ with D? אሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ. 
8. Repeat steps 4 to 6 until  D?଴ ൎ D?ଵ. 
9. Adjust T, if necessary. 
It is easy to check by inspecting the residuals from the numerical solution to the equilibrium 
equations that this algorithm delivers a solution. In the Appendix, we show that the solution is 
locally stable and unique in the neighbourhood of the steady state defined above for the 
parameter values considered in the numerical exercise. 
In section 4, we also show that the final steady state obtained this way is a close approximation 
of the one obtained from an iterative algorithm of Savard (2003) also used in Benczur et al. 
(2018). In such an iterative algorithm, the estimated aggregate labour supply response enters the 
macro model as a shock, and the corresponding wage level is computed. This new wage level is 
in turn returned to the microsimulation exercise to obtain a new evaluation of the aggregate 
labour supply response. Such iteration continues until convergence. 
3. Tax reform scenarios 
The tax and social transfer system in Slovakia went through a significant change over the past 
ten years. In 2004, both the tax system and social benefits were substantially redesigned. The 
main idea of the reform was set on the assumption that Slovak tax system is too complicated 
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and burdensome and that all rates should be replaced by a single tax rate. Therefore, effective 
from 2004, the system of graduated personal income tax (PIT) rates was simplified to a 19% flat 
rate system. Krajcir and Odor (2005) show that increases in non-taxable allowances played a key 
role in preserving the system as moderately progressive and ensuring that the 2004 Slovak flat 
tax reform made certain groups of lower middle class earners no worse off ceteris paribus. Payroll 
taxes, i.e. social and health insurance paid by economically active population, stayed in general 
unreformed, although contributions were reduced by about 2 percent. In the end, the system as 
a whole remained complicated, with different bases and ceilings needed to be applied to 
different types of social and health insurance contributions.  A large part of the system of social 
transfers was overhauled involving significant cuts in levels of benefits, with the aim to increase 
work incentives.  
Only few minor changes in the system followed this bigger overhaul, some of which can be seen 
as a process of a gradual Ȃ mostly symbolic - departure from the system of a single marginal tax 
rate. These measures are the focus of this paper. They include: 
1. Tapering of the basic tax allowance (2007): a gradual reduction in basic tax allowance of PIT 
has been introduced to tax payers with annual gross earnings exceeding about 18,000 euros. 
This amount is approximately twice the Slovak average yearly gross wage and the 
arrangement affected roughly the top 10 percent of the tax payers.  
2. Abandonment of the flat tax rate: an additional income tax band starting at annual earnings 
worth 34,400 euros with a 25 percent personal income tax rate was introduced. Based on the 
actual earnings distribution of economically active population, the higher tax rate applies 
roughly to the top 1.5 percent of Slovak tax payers. 
In addition to these measures enacted in practice, we also examine two hypothetical scenarios 
involving a return to the system of graduated tax rates similar to the one that existed in Slovakia 
before the introduction of the flat-rate system. In our first hypothetical scenario, we make sure 
the reform is approximately fiscally neutral in a static simulation by undoing the increase in the 
basic non-taxable allowance and the child tax credit whose introduction formed an integral part 
of the flat-tax reform. In the second scenario, we keep these implicit transfers at their elevated 
level, and adjust the top rates of income tax to ensure revenue neutrality. 
The initial steady state assumed in this study is the situation in Slovakia in 2012. The reference 
dataset is the SK-SILC survey corresponding to the income reference period 2012 and the 
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reference microsimulation model is SIMTASK calibrated to replicate the state of legislation valid 
in 2012.  
In sum, the assessment of the following four departures from the 2012 baseline is provided: 
Ȉ Scenario 1: abolition of the progressive reduction in tax allowance  
In this scenario, a progressive reduction in basic tax allowance of PIT, originally introduced in 
2007, is abolished.  
Ȉ Scenario 2: two tax brackets in 2013  
This scenario directly assesses the effect of change valid from 2013 when two tax brackets of the 
PIT were introduced. Incomes are taxed by the 19 percent tax rate and a 25 percent income tax 
is applied to earnings exceeding a threshold value. 
Ȉ Scenario 3: Hypothetical larger-scale abolition of the flat tax  
This hypothetical scenario simulates the effect of introduction of tax brackets that were valid 
before the flat-tax reform in 2004. Five tax brackets with rates 10, 20, 28, 35 and 38 percent were 
defined as in 2003, their thresholds were updated according to the growth of average nominal 
wage between 2003-2013. Moreover, the scenario assumes the cancellation of the child tax credit 
and a reduction in the basic tax allowance by 22 percent. The latter makes the reform revenue 
neutral in a static sense, and provides a good approximation of the inverse of the flat tax reform 
enacted in 2004. 
Ȉ Scenario 4: Hypothetical larger-scale abolition of the flat tax 
This scenario is similar to the scenario 3 but the highest marginal rates are being adjusted to 
ensure revenue neutrality (again, in a static sense) instead of the cuts in allowances. More 
specifically, the tax rates become 10, 30, 52, 55 and 60 percent. 
4. Results 
First, we discuss the impact of the alternative tax reforms on the aggregate economy. This is 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Marginal departures from the flat tax in Scenarios 1 and 2 (shown in Figure 1) have only negligible 
consequences at the level of the aggregate economy. The hypothetical scenarios, in particular 
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Scenario 4, however, produce quantitatively more significant impacts (see Figure 2), and indicate 
that policy makers may face interesting trade-offs in policy design.19 
Due to the statutory settings of the Slovak tax and transfers system, the marginal departures 
from the 2004 flat tax leave the income of most earners largely unaffected, and so we are left 
with insignificant effects on the intensive as well as extensive margins. 
On the other hand, when we examine the more radical hypothetical reform under Scenario 4 
involving significant increases in the progressivity of the tax system, we identify the intensive 
margin effect as an important driving force of the results. The reform also involves positive net 
income changes for the low- to middle-income earners, and so we see positive labour supply, 
and ultimately, employment effects. These employment gains, however, amount to the 
involvement of a pool of relatively low-skilled workers in the production process. Such gains in 
labour input do little to offset the negative effect of high marginal tax rates on the effective 
(productivity-adjusted) hours worked in the economy. Hence, employment gains are associated 
with a negative composition effect leading to a dilution of the overall productivity of the 
workforce, and a fall in aggregate output.20 The intensive and extensive margin effects thus 
operate in opposing directions just as in Holter et al. (2015). The right-hand panel in Figure 3 
plots the labour supply response by income deciles which supports the above narrative. 
In Slovakia, the original intention back in the early 2000s was to make the flat tax system 
revenue-neutral ceteris paribus relative to its predecessor. This involved raising some of the 
transfers implicit in the tax system to offset the increased taxation of low-income households 
under unified marginal taxation. Nevertheless, some below-average earners experienced 
moderate net income losses in the short run (Krajcir and Odor, 2005). Above average earners 
experienced a moderate cut in their marginal tax rate. Our Scenario 3 mimics the inverse of this 
reform. We see virtually all macroeconomic variables, including employment, real wages, and 
output, remaining largely unchanged following the reform. The reversal of the flat-tax reform 
would leave those on the lowest incomes with lower gains from employment, and hence their 
                                                     
19 The trade-offs are even more pronounced once distributional consequences are considered, as in Peichl 
(2009). The main focus in this paper is on aggregate outcomes. Evaluating the distributional implications 
in a model-consistent way is an important challenge for the future (see our concluding remarks). 
20  The fact that certain income groups could lose out (gain) ceteris paribus from the introduction 
(abolishing) of a flat tax reform was recognized by Hall and Rabushka (1983). This has been confirmed 
with particular reference to the middle classes in the simulations of Altig et al. (2001) for the United States 
and Fuest et al. (2008) for Germany. 
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labour supply falls, whilst people in the middle of the income distribution approximately up to 
the average wage would supply more labour. The left-hand panel in Figure 3 makes it clear that 
the aggregate result is a composite of such relatively small labour supply effects with different 
signs across income deciles that tend to counteract each other. 
Overall, our analysis implies that the distribution of gains and losses due to the tax reforms may 
matter not only at the level of the individual but on aggregate too. Our method provides of way 
of establishing whether that is indeed the case. We saw that in the case of larger-scale reforms, 
it is essential to consider the extensive margin effects together with the effects on top earners to 
get a complex view of tax and benefit reforms. 
As regards the speed of adjustment under the baseline calibration, about half of the adjustment 
from one steady state to another in (un)employment occurs within 7 quarters, although it may 
take in excess of ten years for these variables to adjust fully. By contrast, almost 70 percent of 
the adjustment in effective labour and capital happen on impact. This is due to the fact that the 
adjustment in labour supply on the intensive margin is assumed to be instantaneous. In section 
5, we test the sensitivity of this speed of adjustment to different parameterizations and 
extensions of the model. The real wage rate and household consumption undershoot their long-
run levels in transition in three out of the four scenarios we consider which is important for 
welfare considerations. 
For the sake of completeness, in Table 1 we display static as well as the long run fiscal effects for 
some items of the budget obtained by plugging back the macroeconomic outcomes into our 
microsimulation tool. In general, the first two scenarios Ȃ in which we simulate marginal 
departures from 2004 flat tax system - lead only to negligible changes in fiscal revenues.  
The tax systems simulated in the third and fourth scenarios are constructed to be approximately 
fiscally neutral in a static simulation. The long run effects are therefore more interesting. Under 
scenario 3, we see a significant drop in personal income tax and the related social insurance 
contributions. The effect is even more pronounced in the last scenario, where we levy very high 
tax rates on the incomes of top earners. Consequently, the top earners decrease labour supply at 
the intensive margin, and the new equilibrium value for gross real wages is also lower than its 
baseline value. As a result, revenue from personal income tax decreases by 10 per cent and 
income from social and health insurance contributions decreases by 4 per cent. Saving on social 
benefits spending arising from the favourable employment dynamic does little to offset the 
revenue shortfall. 
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Figure 1 The response of the macroeconomic variables under Scenarios 1 and 2 
  
Notes: The employment and unemployment rates, and the probability of a match are reported in levels. 
The responses of effective labour, output, capital, the wage rate, vacancies, consumption and profit are 
reported in percentages of initial steady-state values. The effective payroll rate, the trade balance-to-
output ratio are reported as a percentage-point difference relative to the initial steady state. On the 
horizontal axes, we have units of time in quarters. 
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Figure 2 The response of the macro variables under hypothetical tax-reform scenarios 
  
Notes: The employment and unemployment rates, and the probability of a match are reported in levels. 
The responses of effective labour, output, capital, the wage rate, vacancies, consumption and profit are 
reported in percentages of initial steady-state values. The effective payroll rate, the trade balance-to-
output ratio are reported as a percentage-point difference relative to the initial steady state. On the 
horizontal axes, we have units of time in quarters. 
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Figure 3 The distribution of the labour supply response in the final steady state 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
  
 
Table 1 Percentage change in fiscal variables under different scenarios  
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Short-run effects     
Personal income tax -1.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Social and Health insurance 
contributions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Social benefits 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Long-run effects     
Personal income tax -1.0 0.1 -1.8 -10.3 
Social and Health insurance 
contributions 0.2 0.0 -1.0 -4.1 
Social benefits -0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.4 
 
In principle, one could compute the fiscal effects for any or all periods along the whole transition 
path based on the path for the probability of employment and the real wage rate. The real wage 
rate tends to undershoot its long-run level in three out of the four scenarios considered. In those 
cases, the transitional fiscal effects are likely to be worse than the long-run outcomes. 
Further fiscal implications can be derived from the macroeconomic model. Assuming constant 
effective tax rates, the tax intake will mimic the dynamics of the tax bases. In the scenarios in 
which consumption undershoots its final steady-state level, indirect taxation will act to worsen 
the budget balance in transition. By contrast, in scenario 4, net-asset-financed increases in 
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consumption and a rise in corporate profits will act to compensate for the shortfall in personal 
income taxation. 
Table 2 Comparison of steady-state results under two methodologies (in %) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Employment 
rate 
0.004 0.005  0.003  0.005  
(2.598) 
Effective 
labour 
0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  
(0.005) 
Gross wage 
rate 
0.003  0.003  0.002  0.004  
(2.426) 
Output 0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  
(0.005) 
Vacancy rate 0.155  0.156  0.101  0.182  
(2.702) 
Notes: The numbers in the table give the absolute value of the difference in the solutions for the final 
steady-state value of the respective variables using our methodology versus the iterative procedure of 
Savard (2003) as a percentage of the initial steady-state value of the respective variable. The values are 
in percentages with 1 denoting 1 percent. The values in the brackets in the last column normalise the 
same absolute difference by the absolute value of the change in the variable between the two steady 
states. 
 
Last but not least, we demonstrate that the long-run results reported above are a very close 
approximation to those one would obtain in an iterative solution à la Savard (2003), should the 
(static) steady-state equations of the model in section 2 be seen as a CGE setup. In Table 2, we 
report two normalised measures of the distance between the two solutions. The main measure 
reported for all four scenarios is the absolute value of the difference in the solutions for the final 
steady-state value of the respective variables using our methodology versus the iterative 
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procedure of Savard (2003) expressed as a percentage of the initial steady-state value of the 
respective variable (1 in the table corresponds to 1 percent deviation). 
For scenario 4, we also report the same absolute difference in the solution for the final steady 
state across the two methodologies expressed as a percentage of the absolute value of the change 
in the value of the respective variable from one steady state to another. Clearly, this latter 
measure is more relevant, as it better captures the intuitive notion of accuracy one would like to 
achieve in these simulation exercises. This measure can, however, provide disproportionately 
large values if the magnitude of the change across steady states (the denominator) is very small 
which is the case in our scenarios 1 to 3. Reassuringly, both measures indicate very small 
differences in the case of scenario 4. 
Figure 4 Employment-wage relationship: Accuracy of polynomial approximations 
Notes: The dots in the top panels in the figures show the aggregate labour supply responses 
corresponding to different wage levels under a given scenario obtained from the behavioural 
microsimulation exercise. The solid lines show the polynomial providing the best fit. The bottom panels 
plot the residuals from the estimation of the polynomial. 
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This is a result of our polynomials providing a good approximation to employment-wage (labour 
supply) schedule obtained for a discrete set of values from the microsimulation exercise. This 
fact is demonstrated in Figure 4 which plots the actual and fitted employment levels for various 
wage shocks relative to the baseline wage level under the different scenarios. As mentioned 
before, different approximation methods could raise this accuracy further but the obtained level 
of accuracy was deemed sufficient for practical purposes. 
5. Sensitivity checks and extensions 
In the macroeconomic module of the model, we rely extensively on calibration. The parameter 
values used in the baseline version were based on observed or estimated values for Slovakia. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore the consequences of alternative values, especially for 
the speed of transition from one steady state to another following a policy change. In this section, 
therefore, we explore the sensitivity of the baseline results to some key parameter values.  
We also extend the model to include more real rigidity to see how transition from one steady 
state to another is affected. Specifically, we introduce capital adjustment costs, and explore the 
consequences of their presence for the speed of adjustment in the labour market. 
We could also consider habit persistence in consumption - a commonly used features of DSGE 
models. Note, however, that the macro model can be solved in two separate blocks with (3), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), (10), (11) and the relevant polynomials for D?ǡ D?D?௪ representing a self-standing 
system determining adjustment in the labour market. Hence, adding habit persistence in 
consumption would only affect the dynamic of aggregate consumption in this model. 
Nevertheless, this extension could be a useful extension to improve the performance of the 
model vis-à-vis data. 
In an analysis in which labour market dynamics play a central role, it comes as natural to raise 
the potential role for (real) wage rigidity. In our framework, the interaction between employers 
and job seekers/employees is fully dealt with in the empirical section. The estimations that 
underlie our reduced-form labour supply schedule described in section 2 are all based on a static 
optimization problem. The clean way of introducing wage rigidity would be to consider their 
dynamic version. This is a major task and would be a significant self-standing contribution to 
the empirical literature too. 
We also tried introducing convex costs of adjustment in (effective) employment levels in the 
spirit of Nickell (1986) to inject more dynamics into labour demand, and to account for costs 
related to employment fluctuation not accounted for by matching frictions. While such 
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modification has the potential to affect dynamics in the model, the level of costs (as a percentage 
of aggregate output) that have to be assumed to generate a significant deviation from the 
baseline results is unrealistically large. 
In what follows, we shall demonstrate the effects of alternative parameter values and the 
extension to the model on Scenario 4 given that the magnitude of the effects induced by the 
policy change is largest, and hence the consequences of parametric changes are likely to be most 
visible. 
5.1. Alternative parameter values 
In all our alternative calibrations, we have to make sure the initial steady state of the model is 
consistent with the (un)employment rates, aggregate productivity D?, the vacancy rate, and the 
ǯD?௪ observed in the empirical sample. We achieve this by 
adjusting the parameter D? in the matching function to an appropriate value. 
We consider three alternative parameterisations to the baseline version of the model. First, the 
world real return is doubled to two percent quarterly. Second, parameter D? driving exogenous 
job separation in the labour market is increased from approximately 0.004 to 0.006. Finally, 
elasticity of matching D? is increased from 0.8 to 0.9. 
Such parametric changes have a notable impact on the speed of adjustment in the model. By 
contrast, we have found our results in terms of dynamics to be fairly robust to the parameters of 
the production function. 
Figure 5 displays the consequences of the mentioned parametric changes for dynamics in the 
model economy.  
The world real rate of return is intrinsically linked to the rate of time preference in this 
framework. Doubling it is equivalent to increasing the rate of time preference of agents or 
reducing their discount factor. As firms discount the gains from continuation of a match in the 
labour market more heavily, fewer such matches happen, and the (un)employment rate adjusts 
more gradually too. 
Increasing the exogenous separation rate leads to a faster adjustment on the extensive margin 
in the labour market. About half of the adjustment in employment now happens within just 5 
quarters as opposed to 7 quarters in the baseline version. This has obviously implications for the 
evolution of vacancies and the probability of finding a match. As consumption is non-separable 
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from labour in our model, consumption dynamic follows the same pattern. By contrast, effective 
labour driven also by the adjustment on the intensive margin is affected to a lesser extent. 
On the other hand, if vacancies are turned into a match less effectively, the adjustment takes 
longer. With D? ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, it takes 10 quarters for employment to achieve half of the adjustment. 
Figure 5 Sensitivity analysis (scenario 4) 
Notes: The employment and unemployment rates are reported in levels. The responses of effective 
labour, output, capital, the wage rate, vacancies, consumption and profit are reported in percentages of 
initial steady-state values. The effective payroll rate, the probability of a match and the trade balance-
to-output ratio are reported as a percentage-point difference relative to the initial steady state. On the 
horizontal axes, we have units of time in quarters. 
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5.2. A model with capital adjustment costs 
We model capital adjustment costs following Mendoza (1991).21 ǯ
(2), and the profit function get augmented for a cost term of the following form: 
I?ଶ ሺD?௧ାଵ െ D?௧ሻଶ 
with D? being a small positive parameter. As a consequence, the aggregate resource constraint 
(12) becomes D?௧ െ D?D?௧ െ I?ଶ ሺD?௧ାଵ െ D?௧ሻଶ ൌ D?௧ ൅ D? ൅ D?௧ ൅ D?D?௧,      (18) 
ǯ-order condition with respect to capital is modified to D?D?௧I?ିଵሾD?D?௧I?൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?௧I?ሿቀI?഑ିଵቁ ൅ D�?ሺD?௧ାଵ െ D?௧ሻ െ D?ିଵD?ሺD?௧ െ D?௧ିଵሻ ൌ ௥ሺଵିIXI?ሻǤ  (19) 
In Figure 6, we plot the response of the macroeconomy in the baseline model together with the 
response in the extended version in which firms pay a three-percent capital adjustment cost 
(D? ൌ  ?Ǥ  ?ሻ which is a value close to the value used in Mendoza (1991). 
The main consequence of introducing capital adjustment costs is a slower adjustment in capital, 
and a more subdued improvement in the external balance, as demand for investment contracts 
less sharply. Dynamics elsewhere in the economy remain largely unaffected. As in Mendoza 
(1991), this form of rigidity can improve the modelǯs ability to better match investment volatility 
in the model economy with observed volatility in the data. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have introduced a novel way of linking microsimulation models with dynamic general 
equilibrium frameworks. Our modelling approach allows us to consider the impact of a wide 
range of finely-tuned tax and benefit reforms range of effects on important aggregate and cross-
sectional indicators, including their transitional dynamics, in a relatively simple simulation 
exercise. 
We demonstrated the usefulness of this approach by evaluating the aggregate macroeconomic 
and fiscal effects of actual and hypothetical tax reforms in the context of Slovakia. We have 
shown that positive employment effects are likely to emerge if reforms are designed to increase 
the after-tax income of the low earners. On the other hand, reform-driven employment increases 
                                                     
21  Investment adjustment costs à la Christiano et al. (2005) could be a somewhat more elaborate 
alternative. We prefer the approach that naturally extends our simple baseline framework. 
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brought about through an inflow of low-skilled workers coupled with a reduction in work 
intensity by the highly skilled may be negative for growth. We have thus demonstrated yet again 
that policy makers face non-trivial trade-offs when designing tax systems. 
 
Figure 6 The response of the macro variables under scenario 4 with and without capital 
adjustment costs 
 
Notes: The employment and unemployment rates, and the probability of a match are reported in levels. 
The responses of effective labour, output, capital, the wage rate, vacancies, consumption and profit are 
reported in percentages of initial steady-state values. The effective payroll rate is given in percentage 
point differences while the trade balance-to-output ratio is reported as a percentage-point difference 
relative to the initial steady state. On the horizontal axes, we have units of time in quarters. 
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The focus of this paper has been on the aggregate macroeconomic and fiscal effects. There are 
two areas where important further work could be done to broaden the scope of the analysis. 
First, extending the analysis to have a thorough assessment of the distributive impact of reforms 
consistent with the general equilibrium model is a natural start. Second, whilst our model 
considers lots of heterogeneity in terms of income, the construction of the macro model still 
assumes complete insurance with regards to consumption. Relaxing this assumption is 
important to have a more complex understanding of the consequences of tax and benefit 
reforms, including specifically on indirect taxation, and to allow a meaningful welfare analysis. 
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Appendix 
As mentioned in the text, the macro model can be solved in two separate blocks with (3), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), (10), (11) and the relevant polynomials for D?ǡ D?D?D?D?D? ?D? representing a self-standing 
system determining adjustment on the production side. Given our assumptions about income 
pooling at the household level and the small open economy setting, the dynamics of the other 
variables describing the rest of the economy can then be easily solved based on the solution to 
this system. 
Here, we provide a linear approximation to this inner core of the economy to demonstrate that 
ǯ
steady state. 
The nonlinear system of (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), (11) and the relevant polynomials for D?ǡ D?D?D?D?D? ?D? can be approximated to the first order as follows: D?ෝ௧ ൌ D?෠௧ െ D?෡௧ D?෡௧ ൌ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?෡௧ିଵ ൅ D?D?D?ሺD?ො௧ ൅ D?ො௧ሻ D?ෝ௧ ൌ D?D?ො௧ ൅ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?ො௧ D?ො௧ ൌ െ D?D?D?෡௧ D?ො௧ ൌ D?ෝ௧ െ D?ො௧ 
The first-order approximation to (10) implies D?෡௧ ൌ D?෠௧ 
This, in turn, simplifies the approximation to (11) to D?ො௧ ൌ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?D?௧ ො௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ ? ൅ D?௪ሻD?D?D?D? D?ෝ௧ ൅ D?௪D?D?D?D? D?Ƹ௪௧ ൅ ሾሺ ? െ D?ሻD? െ  ?ሿD?ෝ௧Ǥ 
Finally, we have D?ො௧ ൌ IEI?ǡI?IEI?ǡI?D?ෝ௧ for D? ൌ D?ǡ D?ǡ D?௪ Ǥ 
ǡ Ǯ ?ǯ eady state of a given 
variable. 
This system can be reduced to a linear dynamic system of two equations and two unknowns: D? ൬ D?ෝ௧D?௧D?ො௧ାଵ൰ ൌ D? ൬D?ෝ௧ିଵD?ො௧ ൰ 
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with  
 
D? ൌۉۈ
ۇ D?ଵǡேD?଴ǡே ሺ ? ൅D?D?D?ሻ  ?ሾ ? െሺ ? െ D?ሻD?ሿ ቆD?ଵǡ௅D?଴ǡ௅ െ D?ଵǡேD?଴ǡேቇ ൅ D?D?D?D?൫ ? ൅ D?଴ǡIXI? ൅ D?ଵǡIXI?൯ ሺ ? െ D?ሻD?یۋ
ۊ
 
and 
D? ൌቆሺ ? െ D?ሻ IEI?ǡI?IEI?ǡI? ௤௩ே ሺ ? െ D?ିଵሻ ?  ? ቇ. 
To check if the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions are satisfied, we need to inspect the 
eigenvalues of D?ିଵD?. Given that we have one predetermined and one jump variable, we need 
one eigenvalue to be inside and one outside the unit circle in order for the system to have a 
unique and stable solution in the neighbourhood of the steady state. 
Table A1 below shows that the eigenvalues for the four scenarios examined in the main part of 
the paper satisfy this requirement. Hence, for initial values in the neighbourhood of the (final) 
steady state, the system converges to the steady state along a unique equilibrium path. 
Table A1 Eigenvalues 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Eigenvalues 0.8855 
1.1080 
0.8856 
1.1079 
0.8934 
1.0982 
0.8896 
1.1024 
 
